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Japan: Adapting to a New Electoral System
In 1993 the long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) split and lost control of the main chamber of the Japanese Diet in the general election that followed. One of the achievements of the new coalition that formed in its place was reform of the electoral system, which had been widely viewed as a source of corruption and the basis of the LDP’s long-standing dominance.
Under the old electoral system (SNTV), the 511 members of the House of Representatives (the lower house) were elected from 129 districts of between one and six seats each. This system had been in use since 1947 and had produced a distinctive approach to elections among the major parties, particularly the LDP. Under this system any party that hoped to win enough seats to obtain a majority or a significant minority of seats needed to put up multiple candidates in most districts. Thus, in order to maximize their representation, parties needed to find methods of ensuring that each candidate would poll the minimum number of votes required to be elected, rather than having each candidate follow his natural instincts by attempting to maximize his vote. A candidate who received more than his ‘fair share’ of the vote could actually hurt colleagues who received fewer votes: candidate A’s ‘unnecessary votes’ could be enough to prevent candidate B of the same party from gaining a seat.
The LDP dealt with this problem through particularistic policies that targeted selected groups of voters and provided them with ‘pork’ and other benefits. As the first winning party under the SNTV system, the LDP controlled the spoils of office, making it difficult for the various opposition parties to mount an effective challenge. Not surprisingly, this system contributed to corruption. Furthermore, under such a personal and particularistic system, political choice and debate based on substantive policy issues were not given due importance.
By the early 1990s citizens’ anger at the system had produced great pressure for electoral reform. The LDP’s inability to agree on and pass reform legislation contributed to a split in the party that gave power to the opposition (including the LDP defectors) in 1993. The concept of a US-style two-party system and frequent alternation of parties in government had grown in popularity among politicians, scholars and the media, and had come to be seen as a ‘magic bullet’ that would solve the problems of the Japanese political system. As a result, many called for the establishment of a system of single-member districts (SMDs). However, members of the smaller parties in the new government feared that this would crowd them out of the system and thus opposed such a move. The resulting compromise created the two-tier system that is in use today.
The reformed electoral system is a Parallel system consisting of two tiers—List PR and FPTP single-member districts. Each voter casts one vote in each tier. For the first election under this system, in 1996, there were 200 seats in the PR tier divided between 11 regional districts, ranging in size from seven to 33 seats, and 300 SMDs in the second tier. Efforts at rationalization led the Diet to reduce the number of PR seats to 180 prior to the second election in 2000. The 11 PR districts now range in size from six to 29 seats. In a Parallel system, there is no compensatory mechanism that adjusts the overall number of seats won by each party to better reflect the proportion of the vote actually received. The predominance of SMD seats over PR seats thus advantages larger parties that can win SMD seats. The two tiers of the Japanese electoral system are related in another, more unusual, way, however. Japan’s electoral laws allow candidates to mount dual candidacies by standing both on a PR list and for an SMD seat.
While the PR tier is technically closed-list, there is also a provision that allows for some degree of voter influence over the ranking of candidates on the lists. Parties are allowed to present lists that give equal rankings to some or all of those candidates who are nominated both on a party list and for an SMD. After those who win in the SMDs are removed from consideration, the final ranking of the SMD losers on the PR list is determined by how well each polled in comparison to the winner in his or her district.
This provision has a number of benefits for parties. First, it allows them to abdicate the politically challenging job of ranking candidates. Second, it encourages candidates who are ranked equally on the PR lists to campaign more vigorously to win votes in their districts. While parties do make much use of equal ranking, they also retain the option to give some candidates firm rankings. This is also useful, as a higher or ‘safe’ ranking on the PR list can be used as an incentive to convince a candidate to run in a single-member district in which there is little chance of winning.
The first trial of the system came in 1996, and the results were largely seen as disappointing. In the years since the new electoral laws were passed, the LDP had re-established itself in power and the opposition parties had undergone a number of realignments. This instability led to the persistence of previous patterns, an overall win for the LDP, and little movement towards the hoped-for two-party system. The somewhat complicated nature of the system also produced dissatisfaction among the electorate, particularly regarding the phenomenon of losing SMD candidates being ‘resurrected’ in the PR tier. The results were especially counter-intuitive in cases in which the first- and third- (and occasionally fourth-) placed candidates from a single-member district won seats but the second-placed candidate (usually from the most competitive of the opposition parties) failed to win a place. It was also unclear that any significant decline in corruption and money politics had taken place.
By the time of the second election under the new system, in 2000, there had been a reduction in the number of competitive candidates vying for each SMD seat. However, the move towards a two-party system again made only slight progress as the non-communist opposition was still splintered and the centrist Komeito party had switched sides and joined the LDP-led coalition.
The third test of the new system took place in November 2003. In September, the small Liberal Party merged with the dominant opposition Democratic Party (DPJ). The merged party (which retained the DPJ name) gained an impressive 40 seats in an election that featured the use of party manifestos for the first time. The remaining opposition parties of significant size lost all but a few of their seats. On the government side, the LDP and the smaller of its two coalition parties also lost seats, leading to the smaller party being absorbed by the LDP. With most seats concentrated in the hands of the two leading parties, only Komeito remains as a significant small party. The LDP is still in coalition with Komeito, in part because it needs Komeito support in the upper house, but also because support from the well-organized Komeito played a large part in the victories of many of its SMD candidates.
The results of the legislative election of 2003 support the idea that the effects of electoral system reform are not felt immediately and that entrenched habits and processes require time to change. These outcomes also suggest that the mixed-member system may not be likely to produce a complete consolidation into a US-style two-party system, as the existence of the PR tier allows third parties to persist.

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Uf, malo je poduži...koliko je hitno? Sutra, eventualno preksutra bih ga uradio.

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za petak,hvala u svakom slucaju

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Japan: Prilagođavanje Novom Sistemu Izbora
1993. godine, posle dugog niza godine dominacije, raspala se Liberalno Demokratska Partija (LDP), a na izborima koji su sledili izgubila je kontrolu nad predstavničkim domom Japanske Dijete. Jedna od dostignuća nove koalicije, koja se formirala umesto nje, jeste reformisanje izbornog sistema, koja je dugo vremena važila za izvor korupcije i za osnovu vladanja LDP.
Sa novim izbornim sistemom (SNTV) je izabrano 511 članova za Kuću Predstavnika (niža kuća) iz 129 okruga, i svaki okrug je dobio do 6 mesta. Ovaj sistem se koristi od 1947. godine i rezultirao je prepoznatljivim odnosom prema izborima velikih stranaka, prvenstveno LDP. Sa ovim sistemom, svaka stranka koja se nadala dovoljnom broju mesta da bi bila u većini ili u značajnoj manjini morala je da ima više kandidata u skoro svakom okrugu. Da bi njihova predstavništva bila što veća, stranke su morale da smisle kako da osiguraju minimalni broj glasova za izbor, umesto da se svaki kandidat trudi za sebe. Kandidat koji je dobio veći deo glasova nego što mu treba je mogao da šteti svojim kolegama sa manjim brojem glasova: glasovi "višak" kandidata A su mogli da budu dovoljne da spreče kandidata B iz iste stranke da dobije mesto. LDP je ovaj problem rešavao kroz individualnu politiku koja je ciljala na određene slojeve birača i omogućavala im je "prasetinu" i druge pogodnosti. Kao prva pobednička partija pod novim sistemom, LDP je kontrolisala korist vladavine, čime je raznim opozicionim strankama otežavala vođenje efektivne borbe. Očekivano, ovaj sistem je bio povoljan za korupciju. Takođe, s obzirom na ličnu i individualnu prirodu, odabiru političke pripadnosti i debatama o značajnim političkim problemima nije davao poseban značaj.
Do početka '90-ih gnev ljudi prema sistemu je doveo do velikog pritiska oko reformi. Nemogućnost LDP da donesu zakon o reformama je ubrzao razdvajanje unutar stranke, čime je opozicija (uključujući i bivše članove LDP) dobila na snazi 1993. godine. Koncept dvopartijskog sistema nalik onome što je bilo važeće u Americi i često smenjivanje vladajućih stranaka postajala je sve popularnija među političarima, naučnicima i medijima, što je bitno doprinelo rešenju problema Japanskog političkog sistema. Kao rezultat toga, mnogi su tražili sistem sa jednočlanim okruzima. Međutim, članovi manjih stranaka u novoj vladi su se protivili ovome, jer su se plašili da bi ih to potisnulo iz sistema. Rezultat je bio kompromis čime se stvorio dvoslojni sistem koji je i dan danas u upotrebi.
Reformisani izborni sistem je Paralelni sistem koji se sastoji od dva sloja - jednočlani okruzi List PR i FPTP. Svaki birač glasa jednom u svakom sloju. Kod prvih izbora u ovom sistemu, koji su se održali 1966.godine, bilo je 200 mesta u PR sloju na 11 regionalnih okruga, pri čemu je svaki od njih dobio između sedam u 33 mesta, dok se drugi sloj odnosio na 300 jednočlanih okruga. Zbog pokušaja racionalizacije, Dijeta je smanjila broj PR mesta na 180 pre nego što su se održali drugi izbori 2000. godine. 11 PR okruga sada imaju između šest i 29 mesta. U Paralelnom sistemu ne postoji mehanizam za kompenzaciju, koji bi korigovao ukupan broj mesta osvojenih od strane svake stranke da bi se jasnije prikazala proporcija osvojeih glasova. Dominantnost mesta jednočlanih okruga nad PR mestima je takođe značila da veće stranke imaju prednost u osvajanju mesta jednočlanih okruga. Dva sloja Japanskog izbornog sistema su, međutim, i u drugom, nesvakidašnjem odnosu. Zakoni izbora Japana omogućavaju kandidatima dvojnu kandidaturu - na PR listi i za mesto jednočlanih okruga.
Dok PR lista suštinski ima zatvorene liste, postoji i određena mogućnost za uticanje na rangiranje kandidata na listi od strane birača. Stranke mogu da imaju liste na kojima se neki ili svi kandidati koji su nominovani i za listu stranke i za jednočlane okruge rangiraju jednako. Kada se oni koji su pobedili za jednočlane okruge izuzmu iz obzira, formira se finalno rangiranje gubitnika jednočlanih okruga na PR listi tako što se upoređuje kako se oni kotiraju u odnosu na pobednika u tom okrugu.
Ovakav princip ima brojne prednosti za stranke. Prvo, omogućuje im se abdikacija rangiranja kandidata, što je relativno težak politički zadatak. Drugo, pospešuje kandidate koji su jednako rangirani na PR listama da organizuju što bolje kampanje da bi dobili glasove u svojim okruzima. Dok stranke i te kako iskorišćavaju jednako rangiranje, takođe zadržavaju i pravo da daju jake rangove nekim kandidatima. Ovo je takođe korisno, jer se jače ili "sigurnije" rangiranje na PR listi može iskoristiti kao argument za ubeđivanje kandidata da učestvuje u jednočlanom okrugu gde ima male šanse za pobedu.
Prvi probni sistem je nastao 1996. godine, a rezultati su bili uglavnom razočaravajući. U periodu posle proglašavanja novog izbornog sistema LDP je povratio svoju moć, a opozicione stranke su pretrpele brojna restrukturiranja. Ovaj nedostatak stabiliteta je doveo do istrajnosti prethodnih modela, pobedi LDP i malom napretku ka željenom dvopartijskom sistemu. Donekle komplikovana priroda sistema je takođe dovela do nezadovoljnosti izbornog tela, najviše zbog fenomena "oživljavanja" kandidata jednočlanih okruga koji su izgubili u PR sloju. Rezultati su bili naročito neintuitivni u slučajevima gde su kandidati sa prvog i trećeg (i nekad sa četvrtog) mesta jednočlanog okruga dobili mesta, dok je drugoplasirani kandidat (najčešće iz najjače opozicione partije) ostao uskraćen za mesto. Takođe nije bilo jasno da se pojavilo značajno umanjenje korupcije i novčane politike.
Do drugih izbora pod novim sistemom 2000. godine smanjio se broj kandidata koji su se borili za mesto u jednočlanim okruzima. Međutim, približavanje ka dvopartijskom sistemu je sporo napredovalo, jer je ne-komunistička opozicija i dalje bila raštrkana, a centralistička stranka Komeito prešla je na drugu stranu i pridružila se koaliciji koju je vodio LDP.
Treći test novog sistema desio se novembra 2003. godine. Mala Liberalna Partija spojila se sa dominantnom opozicijom, sa Demokratskom Partijom u septembru. Nova stranka (koja je zadržala ime Demokratska Partija) dobila je čak 40 mesta na izborima kada su po prvi put korišćeni manifesti stranaka. Preostale opozicione stranke izgubile su skoro sva svoja mesta. Sa strane vlade, LDP i manja koaliciona stranka su takođe izgubili mesta, što je dovelo do spajanja te manje stranke sa LDP-om. Kako je najveći deo mesta pripao dvema vodećim strankama, jedina preostala stranka od značaja bila je Komeito. LDP je ostao u koaliciji sa Komeito-m, delimično zbog toga što im je trebala njihova podrška u gornjem domu, ali i zato što je podrška dobro organizovanog Komeito-a velikim delom uticala na pobede mnogih kandidata za jednočlane okruge.
Rezultati izbori zakona iz 2003. podržali su ideju da posledice reformi izbornog sistema ne stupe na snagu odmah, ali i na činjenicu da je potrebno vreme da se ustaljene navike i procesi promene. Ovakvi ishodi takođe nagoveštavaju da sistem sa mešovitim članovima možda e može da dovede do kompletne konsolidacije u dvopartijski sistem nalik Američkom, jer je prisustvo PR sloja omogućavala i postojanje trećih stranaka.

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Pregledaj ceo tekst i ispravi eventualne greške, jer ja nisam upućen u ovakvu terminologiju uopšte. Najbitniji detalj na koji bih ti skrenuo pažnju jeste nešto što se zove Japanese Diet - pojma nemam šta to znači, pa sam stavio bukvalan prevod.

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A ona ni hvala da kaze :-)